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Criminal Laws on 
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the European Union
Luigi Cajani
Sapienza University of Rome
Since the early 1990s, one can observe in 
Europe a proliferation of memory wars 
and controversies related to tragic histori-
cal events. The reasons are many and both 
of a domestic and international nature: the 
multicultural transformation of many soci-
eties that has involved the self-assessment 
of previously silent communities, which de-
mand public recognition for what they con-
sider their own historical identity; the cri-
sis of Cold War political ideologies, which 
has given representation to political actors 
which were previously marginalised from 
the main historical narrative of states;1 
tensions with former colonies, which claim 
reparations for colonial crimes and the 
slave trade;2 and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, with the birth of new states which 
want to come to terms with past wounds. 
A particular feature of these memory wars 
is the use of the penal code in order to en-
force a unique, official interpretation of 
these events and to punish diverging opin-
ions. A corpus of new laws is thus being 
established, which are often mutually in-
fluenced and which have given rise to con-
cerns over their impact on the freedom of 
expression and particularly on the freedom 
of historical research. Historians are in fact 
directly targeted by the provisions of these 
laws, alongside journalists, teachers, poli-
ticians and anybody who makes use of his-
torical discourse.
A significant example of these conflicts and 
of the political bias on historical discourse 
is the Holodomor, the famine of 1932–33 in 
Ukraine, which is matter of heated contro-
versy not only between Russia and Ukraine 
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but also inside Ukraine. Historians debate on the interpretation of this event: some maintain that 
it was a genocide planned by the Soviet regime in order to crush Ukrainian resistance against 
collectivisation while others consider it rather as the consequence of gross mistakes on the part 
of the regime, which, unable to face an agricultural crisis, actually worsened it but which did not 
have the intention of targeting the Ukrainian people.3 
On 28 November 2006 Ukraine’s parliament passed a law4 declaring the Holodomor an act of 
genocide against the Ukrainian people, and added that its public denial should be considered as 
dishonouring the memory of the millions of victims and humiliating the dignity of the Ukrainian 
people, and, therefore, be deemed unlawful. The issue was very much debated between the op-
posing anti-Russian and pro-Russian fronts, the former represented by President Viktor Yush-
chenko, who accepted the famine’s characterisation as genocide, and the latter by his opponent 
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, who rejected it, arguing that the famine was the outcome of 
the mass collectivisation of farms which affected the whole Soviet Union and not specifically 
Ukraine. The divided opinion was mirrored by the vote: only 233 MPs supported the bill – a mini-
mum of 226 votes was required for it to be passed – while 200 deputies abstained. 
This law had, of course, an international resonance. The Ukrainian government in fact acted in 
order to have other states recognise the quality of genocide. On 28 May 2008, Canada, where 
there is a strong community of Ukrainian origin, recognised the “Ukrainian Famine of 1932–33 as 
an act of genocide” and established an Ukrainian Famine and Genocide (“Holodomor”) Memorial 
Day,5 but without foreseeing a punishment for its denial. Also, the European Parliament recog-
nised, on 23 October 2008, the Holodomor as “an appalling crime against the Ukrainian people, 
and against humanity”. The text of the resolution avoided using the term “genocide”, but in any 
case backed an interpretation which charged the Soviet government with the intention of target-
ing Ukraine: “[It] was cynically and cruelly planned by Stalin’s regime in order to force through 
the Soviet Union’s policy of collectivisation against the will of the rural population in Ukraine.”6 
On the opposite side, the Russian Duma on 2 April 2008 approved a statement which expressed 
sorrow for the famine tragedy which struck much of the Soviet Union in the 1930s, but rejected 
the charge of genocide, asserting that “there is no historical evidence that the famine was or-
ganised along ethnic lines. Its victims were millions of Soviet citizens, representatives of differ-
ent peoples and nationalities living largely in agricultural areas of the country.”7 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe discussed the Holodomor in early 2010, 
and was directly affected by the domestic Ukrainian controversy. It received in fact three docu-
ments: two, from the Our Ukraine party and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, respectively, which sup-
ported the interpretation of the famine as genocide, and another from the Party of Regions, which 
supported Yanukovych, who in February 2010 succeeded Yushchenko as state president, which 
asserted that the famine did not fully meet the criteria established for the crime of genocide by 
the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948.8 On 27 
April 2010 Yanukovych attended a sitting of the Parliamentary Assembly, and when asked about 
his opinion on this pending issue, declared that the great famine of the 1930s had affected the 
Volga region, Belarus and Kazakhstan as well as Ukraine. He added that it had been a conse-
quence of the policies of the Stalinist regime, and all countries had been affected. To recognise 
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the Holodomor as genocide in respect of one or another people, he said, would be incorrect and 
unfair. It had been a shared tragedy between all members of the Soviet Union.9
Encouraged in this way, on the following day the Parliamentary Assembly passed a resolution 
that stated “Millions of innocent people in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, 
which were parts of the Soviet Union, lost their lives as a result of mass starvation caused by 
the cruel and deliberate actions and policies of the Soviet regime.”10
On the issue of genocide, the resolution avoided a clear position: it simply mentioned that Ukrain-
ian law recognised the famine as a genocide, without further comment. This cautious attitude 
had been actually suggested by the rapporteur, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, who observed that it was not 
opportune to back the thesis of genocide because in Ukraine historians and politicians were not 
unanimous on that and also because “I firmly believe that politicians, both on the national and on 
the international level, should avoid being involved in the interpretation of historical facts of the 
past.”11 In the context of the current history wars, this was a very significant stance for a politi-
cian to take.
Yanukovych’s words in Strasbourg show how a political change can bring about change in an 
official historical interpretation. But Ukrainian law was still there, and on the basis of it Volody-
myr Volosiuk, a member of the People’s Movement of Ukraine, a political party which opposed 
Yanukovych, sued him for this statement and asked the court to oblige the president to apologise 
before him and the Ukrainian people.12 Eventually, after a judicial path through some courts, on 8 
December 2010 the Kyiv Court of Appeals acquitted Yanukovych.13 One might think that it would 
have been difficult for the court to condemn the president, but in any case it seems that, despite 
the law, the behaviour of the Ukrainian courts is not uniform. In fact, in January 2010 an Ukrain-
ian court declared Joseph Stalin and several other senior Soviet officials guilty of genocide.14 But 
the following March, a court in the Donetsk region, in eastern Ukraine, refused to prosecute the 
editor of the Rodnoye Priazovye newspaper, who in an article had written that the Holodomor 
was not a genocide.15 This represents a worrying absence of legal certainty, which reflects the 
split in Ukrainian public opinion.
The prosecution of Holocaust denial
The wave of criminal laws on history has its origin and model in the laws against the denial of 
the Holocaust. The first one was approved in Israel in 1986, and punished with five years’ im-
prisonment “any statement denying or diminishing the proportions of acts committed in the pe-
riod of the Nazi regime, which are crimes against the Jewish people or crimes against human-
ity, with intent to defend the perpetrators of those acts or to express sympathy or identification 
with them”.16 In this text one must underline two points in order to allow for a comparison with 
similar laws. First, the definition of the criminal conduct: not only the simple and total denial of 
the event, but also the diminution of its size; and second, the restrictions placed on the prosecu-
tion: the aforementioned criminal conduct must be qualified by a clear, positive attitude towards 
the perpetrators. 
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Meanwhile, in Europe too the introduction of such a law was discussed as a response to the in-
crease in incidents of anti-Semitism, often in connection with extreme right parties, and in cases 
of Holocaust denials. First came France in 1990 with the so-called Gayssot law (loi Gayssot).17 
This law, which had the general intent of suppressing “every act of racism, anti-Semitism or 
xenophobia”, imposed one year’s imprisonment and a heavy fine (equivalent to €45,000 today) 
on those who disputed “the existence of one or more crimes against humanity defined by arti-
cle 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal appended to the London Agreement of 
8 August 1945”, which made up the legal basis of the Nuremberg trials.18 For the identification 
of these crimes against humanity, both the competence of international and French courts was 
recognised. Concerning the nature of the criminal conduct targeted by the Gayssot law, one must 
note that the French text uses the verb “contester”, which means not only “to deny” but also “to 
dispute” and “to doubt”. This semantic pluralism produces, therefore, a certain ambiguity in the 
interpretation of the conduct. With the French law, in any case, the simple criminal conduct is 
prosecuted, with no need of qualification, as in the Israeli law. The French Human Rights League 
(Ligue des Droits de l’Homme) criticised the Gayssot law for being useless in the fight against 
racism and dangerous for freedom of the press and of research:19 an argument which often re-
curs in the debates about prosecuting Holocaust denial. In an article written in 1990, the historian 
Madeleine Rebérioux added that this law was even superfluous, as shown by the fact that Rob-
ert Faurisson, a well-known Holocaust denier, had been convicted20 for his statements in 1981, 
when this law did not exist, on the base of the provisions that punished defamation. Moreover, 
she continued, judges and historians have different tasks and different strategies, which must 
not be confused: “Historical truth refuses the authority of a state,” she concluded. In a 1996 ar-
ticle, she also foresaw that this law would open the way to the definition of an official historical 
truth also for other genocides.21 
Rebérioux’ clairvoyance was confirmed by the subsequent set of memory laws (lois mémori-
elles) that were approved in France under the pressure of various social groups. 
French citizens of Armenian descent endorsed the law of 29 January 2001 by which France 
recognised the “Armenian genocide” in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War.22 By 
its wording, this law thus assessed the existence of an historical event and its interpretation at 
the same time. While the law did not foresee a punishment for denial, this was soon to come, 
following the pattern of Holocaust denial. In fact, in April 2006 the Socialist MP Didier Migaud 
presented a bill on the Armenian genocide that extended the 2001 law by introducing the same 
penalty established in the Gayssot law. This bill was approved by the National Assembly on its 
first reading, on 12 October 2006,23 but in order to come into force it needed the approval of the 
Senate, which deferred making a decision for years before eventually rejecting it on 4 May 2011. 
During the debate in the Senate, one of the main arguments introduced by the rapporteur, Jean-
Jacques Hyest, was that it was not the task of legislators to give juridical definitions of the past 
and to connect these definitions with criminal penalties.24 
French citizens of black African descent promoted the Taubira law (loi Taubira), approved on 21 
May 2001, which defined as crimes against humanity both the slave trade, in the Atlantic and In-
dian oceans, and slavery itself, practiced from the fifteenth century onwards “in America, in the 
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Caribbean region, in the Indian Ocean and in Europe against the African, Amerindian, Madagas-
can and Indian peoples”.25 This law also prescribed that the slave trade and slavery must be al-
lowed “the position they deserve” both in school programmes and in historical research.26 This 
law, too, did not introduce any penalties. 
Initially, these two laws did not arouse any serious concern among historians and history teach-
ers, but in 2005 a scandal erupted with the passing, on February 23, of the Mekachera law (loi 
Mekachera) on French colonialism, promoted by the lobby of the pieds noirs (French citizens 
repatriated after the end of the Algerian war). The law declared that “The nation expresses its 
gratitude to women and men who participated in the activities carried out by France in the former 
French départements in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Indochina and in the other territories pre-
viously under French sovereignty.”27
Like the Taubira law, the Mekachera law dictated that the history of the French people overseas, 
and especially in north Africa, should be allowed the “position it deserves” in academic research; 
but then it went much further, prescribing that school programmes should also recognise the 
“positive role” played by the French people in that context.28 This latter clause, which enforced 
the precise interpretation of an historical event and therefore directly interfered with historical 
research and history teaching, immediately raised a storm of protest in France.29 The protest 
soon turned even more fiery because of an incident that showed how this new set of laws could 
become a dangerous tool to attack or blackmail historians. In September 2005, the Collective 
of Antilleans, Guyanese and Réunionnais (Collectifdom) sued the French historian Olivier Pétré-
Grenouilleau, author of an important study on the African slave trade,30 on the charge of “denial 
of crimes against humanity”. This charge was based on a newspaper interview31 in which Pétré-
Grenouilleau had maintained that the slave trade could not be regarded as a case of genocide and 
where he criticised the Taubira law in particular because, by defining the slave trade as a crime 
against humanity, it suggested an inappropriate comparison with the Holocaust. Patrick Karam, 
the president of Collectifdom, also announced that he would appeal to the competent authorities 
with a request that Pétré-Grenouilleau be suspended from academic teaching.
The reaction of the academic world was very strong, and led to an appeal entitled Liberté pour 
l’histoire,32 which requested the abolition of all the memory laws, on the grounds that “in a free 
state, neither parliament nor the judicial authorities are entitled to define historical truth”. The 
mobilisation was eventually successful: indeed, the second clause of art. 4 of the Mekachera 
law, concerning the teaching of history, was abolished in January 2006, after the Constitution-
al Council had declared that French laws could not contain a prescription of that kind,33 and in 
the following February Collectifdom, confronted with these protests, withdrew its legal action 
against Pétré-Grénouilleau.34
Meanwhile, after France other European states had adopted laws against Holocaust denial, with 
some relevant differences. In 1992 Austria introduced a new article to the Verbotsgesetz (prohi-
bition act), the 1947 law against Nazi activities, punishing with one to ten years’ imprisonment 
(or twenty years’ in case of a particularly serious offense) those who “deny, grossly minimise, 
approve or try to justify” genocide and other Nazi crimes.35 Thus other criminal conducts, typical 
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forms of crimes of opinion, were added to the denial category and became very successful, and 
were adopted by many jurisdictions. 
Germany in 1994 added to section 130 of the Strafgesetzbuch (criminal code), under the heading 
of “Incitement to hatred” (Volksverhetzung), a paragraph which punished with a fine or prison 
sentence of up to five years “whosoever publicly or in a meeting approves, denies or downplays 
an act committed under the rule of National Socialism . . . in a manner capable of disturbing the 
public peace”.36 This law came after ten years of parliamentary debates, during which the possi-
bility of including other crimes against humanity was also discussed, but this idea was dropped 
because, it was felt, this would have belittled the special responsibility of Germany towards Nazi 
crimes.37 
A Belgian 1995 law punished the “denial, minimisation, justification or approval” of the Nazi gen-
ocide with a fine or imprisonment from eight days to one year.38 In 2005 the extension of this 
law to cover other genocides was also discussed. The Belgian lower house approved a draft bill 
which included genocide and other crimes against humanity defined as such by every interna-
tional court recognised by Belgium, by the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, and by a national court in Belgium or any other European Union member state.39 But in 
the event the Senate did not approve the project, which has not surfaced since.40
Luxembourg in 1997 introduced a new penal prosecution of racist acts, including art. 457.3 of the 
penal code, which punished those who “disputed, minimised, justified or denied the existence 
of one or more crimes against humanity and war crimes defined by article 6 of the Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal appended to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945”.41 For 
these crimes it recognised the jurisdiction of Luxembourgian, foreign and international courts. 
The sentence was eight days to six months’ imprisonment and a fine ranging from 10,001 to 
1,000,000 francs, or only one of them. These provisions were also extended to cover genocides 
committed by states other than Nazi Germany, and in these cases only Luxembourgian and in-
ternational courts were recognised. 
In 2002 Romania decided to punish “organisations and symbols with fascist, racist and xenopho-
bic character” and the cult of personalities responsible for crimes against peace and humanity 
and for war crimes who were found guilty by a national or international court.42 In addition, the 
denial of the Holocaust was explicitly mentioned and punished by imprisonment from six months 
to five years and the suspension of rights.43
Other states have approved laws which punish denial and related criminal conducts in relation 
to genocide and crimes against humanity in general, without an explicit reference to those per-
petrated by the Nazis. Art. 261bis of Switzerland’s penal code, introduced in 1993,44 punishes by 
a fine or by imprisonment of up to three years those who “deny, grossly minimise or try to jus-
tify a genocide or other crimes against humanity”. Under art. 240 of the penal code, in 2007 Por-
tugal introduced the punishment for the denial of war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes 
against humanity, the penality being imprisonment from six months to five years.45 With no ref-
erence to the Holocaust or even an explicit mention of genocide, this article rather refers to the 
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three crimes envisaged by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal. Noteworthy is also 
the fact that only the denial of these crimes is prosecuted, and only in connection with public def-
amation or insult against individuals or groups because of race, colour, ethnic or national origin, 
religion, sex or sexual orientation. 
Spain is a case of particular interest. In 1995 a new article (607.2) was added to the penal code, 
which punished both the denial and the justification of genocide, without specifying the Holocaust 
or any other, and without mentioning crimes against humanity.46 But on 7 November 2007 the 
Spanish constitutional court (Tribunal Constitucional) declared it partially unconstitutional, af-
firming that only the justification of genocide can be prosecuted because it may amount, unlike 
the simple denial of it, to an incitement to violence.47 Thus the simple denial of genocide is con-
sidered a legitimate form of the freedom of speech, and it was erased from art. 607.2.
A peculiar agenda has been adopted by some countries of eastern Europe in connection with 
the coming to terms of their postwar relations with the Soviet Union and of their own commu-
nist regimes. Poland in 1998 created the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci 
Narodowej) in order to investigate crimes committed in the country by the Nazi, Soviet and 
Polish communist regimes, and also other crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes,48 and imposed a fine or prison sentence of up to three years for the public denial of 
these crimes.49 In 2002, the Czech Republic introduced art. 261a of the penal code,50 which lumps 
Nazi and the communist crimes together: “Whoever publicly denies, questions, approves or tries 
to justify Nazi or communist genocide or other crimes against humanity committed by Nazis 
or communists shall be punished by a term of imprisonment from six months to three years.”
All these laws make up a complex and heterogeneous picture which has its focus in the punish-
ment of the denial of the Holocaust as a form of anti-Semitism, and therefore of racism, and which 
has been enlarged to encompass other historical events. The fact that the denial of the Holocaust 
is prosecuted does not affect historical research, because denial is totally unscientific. One can dis-
cuss whether the prosecution of Holocaust denial is effective and correct only on a social and legal 
level51 – and indeed this is a constant subject of debates. The very problem arises when legisla-
tors move from the prosecution of the denial of an historical event to the prosecution of the denial 
of their own official interpretation of an historical event, which, on the contrary, interferes with the 
freedom of historical research. By that, a fundamental conceptual shift, or rather a leap, is achieved, 
which is the real core of the problem. There is, in fact, no equivalence or continuity between the 
denial of the existence of an event, such as the Holocaust, and the denial of an opinion on an event 
whose existence is not denied. Moreover, one must also consider that the definition of genocide is 
far from having met general agreement among jurists and historians. Henry Huttenbach, editor of 
the Journal of Genocide Research, clearly depicted the state of the question in 2002:
To date, genocide . . . lacks both a satisfactory conceptual definition and a consensus as to 
the inner make-up of genocide. Without a conceptual definition one is impeded in separat-
ing genocidal events from the non-genocidal; and, lacking a basic blueprint, it is unclear how 
and what to compare and, thereby, determine distinctive singularities and commonalities 
separating and linking genocides.52
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Scholars’ opinions differ about the definition of genocide in terms of the intent and methods of 
the perpetrators and of the characteristics of the victims,53 and, therefore, also about the actual 
cases of genocide. Some scholars limit the definition of genocide only to the Holocaust (the the-
sis of the “uniqueness of the Holocaust”); others extend it to a great number of historical events, 
including the “colonial genocides” of the Herero, the Australian Aborigines and the Native Ameri-
cans, with some finding cases as far back in history as antiquity.54 Also the definition of a war 
crime is a matter of debate: Anthony Grayling, a British philosopher, asserts that the air raids 
carried out by the Allied forces against German and Japanese cities during the Second World 
War were crimes against humanity.55 All in all, there is not – and there cannot be – a solid base 
for fixing in law a definition of historical events of this kind.
Within this legiferation on history one can identify different trends as regards the definition of 
the criminal conducts and the historical events that are their object. Concerning the criminal 
conducts, in some states only the denial is prosecuted; on the contrary other states have added 
other conducts: approval, dispute, justification and (gross) minimisation. While denial and ap-
proval can be clearly enough defined, the meanings of dispute, justification and minimisation 
are rather blurred, and can lead to great uncertainties in judgment, and, therefore, to abuse. Ac-
cording to some jurists, for instance, justification and minimisation can mean that an historical 
event defined as a crime is explained or its gravity is diminished according to the context where 
it happened, for instance if it is considered as the reaction to a danger or to a previous act of vio-
lence.56 Moreover, some states punish these crimes in their simple form, while others punish 
them only when they are qualified. Concerning the historical events themselves, some states 
only mention the Holocaust, others refer to the crimes prosecuted by the Nuremberg tribunal, 
others include the crimes of communist regimes, while others generally speak about genocide 
or crimes against humanity perpetrated by whomsoever, thus opening up the way to the inclu-
sion of every possible historical event characterised by mass massacres. And there is an addi-
tional problem: which authorities are recognised as being entitled to define an historical event as 
a crime? Some states clearly specify national or international tribunals, but others do not, thus 
creating an area of uncertainty about what conduct is punished and where. To take the case of 
the Belgian draft bill discussed in 2005, which recognises the sentences of many international 
courts and of the national courts of all European Union member states: what would happen in 
the case where the courts of two or more states delivered conflicting sentences?
One has finally to remark that many states are absent from this picture: for instance the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands have laws against racism, incitement 
to racial hatred and discrimination, but do not explicitly punish the denial of the Holocaust and 
also do not have criminal laws on other historical events. The reason is that these states have a 
strong tradition of safeguarding the freedom of speech. That shows that in the European Union 
there are two different areas of juridical tradition: a contradiction that the European institutions 
have tried to overcome.
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The initiatives of the European institutions
European institutions have constantly affirmed the will to create a European identity consisting, 
among other shared values, of the fight against racism and discrimination.57 With this aim they 
have promoted an unrelenting set of initiatives in order to approximate the penal provisions of 
the member states.
The first step in this direction was the Joint Action . . . to Combat Racism and Xenophobia of 
1996,58 which established the judicial cooperation of the member states in order to fight the fol-
lowing criminal conducts:
(a) public incitement to discrimination, violence or racial hatred in respect of a group of per-
sons or a member of such a group defined by reference to colour, race, religion or national 
or ethnic origin;
(b) public condoning, for a racist or xenophobic purpose, of crimes against humanity and hu-
man rights violations;
(c) public denial of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal appended to the London Agreement of 8 April 1945 insofar as it includes behaviour 
which is contemptuous of, or degrading to, a group of persons defined by reference to col-
our, race, religion or national or ethnic origin;
(d) public dissemination or distribution of tracts, pictures or other material containing expres-
sions of racism and xenophobia;
(e) participation in the activities of groups, organisations or associations, which involve dis-
crimination, violence, or racial, ethnic or religious hatred.59
This text defined two criminal conducts: condoning and denial. The former was related to every 
crime against humanity (§ b), and the latter was related to the Nazi crimes prosecuted by the 
Nuremberg tribunal (§ c), thus creating a difference, which seems to imply that only the Holo-
caust can be an object of denial, while other crimes are not denied but only condoned – what is 
in fact the case. The prosecution was based on the specific circumstances: racist or xenophobic 
purposes (§ b), and contemptuous or degrading behaviour towards a group of persons defined 
by racial, religious or ethnic features (§ c). These restrictions were relevant insofar as the simple 
condoning and denial were not criminalised, unlike in some laws which were already in force. 
This Joint Action had a seminal but scarcely effective role, and its purposes were picked up again 
by a new of juridical tool, the Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia,60 sub-
mitted by the European Commission on 29 November 2001. Article 4 of this first proposal fol-
lowed the footprints of the Joint Action of 1996, but with some important differences: the con-
temptuous or degrading circumstances were dropped for the punishment of the denial or trivi-
alisation of the crimes prosecuted by the Nuremberg tribunal, and in their place was introduced 
the likelihood of disturbing public order:
Member states shall ensure that the following intentional conduct committed by any means 
is punishable as criminal offence:
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(a) public incitement to violence or hatred for a racist or xenophobic purpose or to any oth-
er racist or xenophobic behaviour which may cause substantial damage to individuals or 
groups concerned;
(b) public insults or threats towards individuals or groups for a racist or xenophobic purpose;
(c) public condoning for a racist or xenophobic purpose of crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes as defined in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court;
(d) public denial or trivialisation of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal appended to the London Agreement of 8 April 1945 in a manner li-
able to disturb the public peace;
(e) public dissemination or distribution of tracts, pictures or other material containing expres-
sions of racism and xenophobia;
(f) directing, supporting of or participating in the activities of a racist or xenophobic group, 
with the intention of contributing to the organisation’s criminal activities.
Like in the Joint Action, the criminal conducts are unevenly attributed: condoning was referred to 
the crimes defined by the Statute of the International Criminal Court, while for the crimes pros-
ecuted by the Nuremberg tribunal, the prosecuted conducts were denial and – what was new in 
comparison to the Joint Action – trivialisation. Art. 6 sets the general features of the penalties, 
which had to be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” (§ 1), and in particular it states that “the 
offences referred to in Article 4(a) and (f) are punishable by terms of deprivation of liberty with 
a maximum penalty that is not less than 2 years” (§ 3), thus giving the impression that these 
criminal conducts deserved more attention than those described in the other subparagraphs. 
At the same time, the Council of Europe was also active in the fight against racism, xenophobia 
and negationism, by opening to signature on 28 January 2003 the Additional Protocol to the Con-
vention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature 
Committed through Computer Systems, which in art. 6 § 1 invited member states to punish the 
distribution through computer systems of 
material which denies, grossly minimises, approves or justifies acts constituting genocide or 
crimes against humanity, as defined by international law and recognised as such by final and 
binding decisions of the International Military Tribunal, established by the London Agreement 
of 8 August 1945, or of any other international court established by relevant international in-
struments and whose jurisdiction is recognised by that Party.
In comparison with the Framework decision, there is a unique set of criminal conducts: some 
of them are similar (with slightly different words) to those of the Framework decision, but there 
is the addition of justification. Concerning the tribunals entitled to assess the crimes that can-
not be denied or trivialised and so on, the Nuremberg tribunal is the only one which is explicitly 
mentioned here, while the International Criminal Court is replaced by a reference to other in-
ternational courts, implicitly meaning the addition also of those on the former Yugoslavia and 
on Rwanda created by the UN Security Council in 1993 and 1994, respectively, and any future 
courts of this kind. 
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Unlike in the Framework decision, the Additional protocol also allows the prosecution of the sim-
ple criminal conducts (art. 6 § 1). This provision has nevertheless a restriction, because the fol-
lowing paragraph (§ 2a) gives to each state the possibility of prosecuting the conducts described 
above only if they are qualified, meaning in case that they were committed “with the intent to 
incite hatred, discrimination or violence against any individual or group of individuals, based on 
race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion if used as a pretext for any 
of these factors, or otherwise”.
But most relevant – and surprising – is the provision of the final paragraph (art. 6 § 2b) which re-
serves to each state the right “not to apply, in whole or in part, paragraph 1 of this article”. Thus, 
states have total freedom in the adoption of the Additional protocol: they can punish only one 
criminal conduct, or they can limit the application only in relation to genocide and not to crimes 
against humanity, and they can even punish nothing at all and ignore this article. On this point the 
Additional protocol is totally different from the Framework decision, which instead is compulso-
ry. This clause allows us to understand the disagreement inside the membership of the Council 
of Europe on the penalisation of denial and of the other related criminal conducts. And in fact, 
among the states which up to 31 July 2011 have signed the Additional Protocol, Denmark, Fin-
land, Norway, Ukraine have made use of the rights in art. 6 § 2b, and quite a few states have not 
signed the Additional protocol at all, including Italy, Russia, Sweden and the United Kingdom.61
The Framework decision declared by art. 16 § 1 that the member states had to take the neces-
sary measures to comply with it by 30 June 2004. This firm expectation fell short, because of the 
resistances of many member states.62 A meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 2–3 
June 2005 gave evidence that an agreement was still far from being achieved. The president-
in-office of the Council, the Luxemburger Luc Frieden, said during a press conference: “We had 
a very political discussion about that framework decision today. I think this is less a legal docu-
ment but rather more a political document . . . The draft framework decision, as amended many 
times by me and the working group over the past months, has found large support though not 
unanimous.”63
The main obstacle had been, he recognised, the different points of view in the member states 
on the freedom of speech: 
In some countries that means that freedom of expression knows almost no boundaries, cer-
tainly no boundaries imposed through criminal law sanctions. For others freedom of expres-
sion does have limits. Those limits that freely elected parliaments put into the criminal code, 
where the interests of others are in conflict with some fundamental human rights. This is a 
debate that one can have for ages.
Less diplomatic newspaper reports unveil some interesting background details.64 On that occa-
sion, the major opponent was Roberto Castelli, justice minister in Silvio Berlusconi’s centre-right 
government, who announced that Italy was going to revise its laws on the freedom of speech, 
as a consequence of a trial initiated against the writer and journalist Oriana Fallaci for offences 
against Islam, and therefore he could not approve any decision of the Council before the Italian 
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parliament had passed a decision on this issue. But Italy was not the only state with concerns 
on this issue. Even before there had been differences between France and some Scandinavian 
states, which refused to give legal assistance in cases of Holocaust deniers prosecuted under 
French justice. The United Kingdom also maintained its reservations.
The progress of the Framework decision stopped for some time, until in January 2007, with the 
beginning of the German presidency of the European Union, the German justice minister, Brigitte 
Zypries, announced her intention to bring about its adoption in order to extend the legislation 
criminalising the denial of genocides, notably the Holocaust, to all the member states of the Eu-
ropean Union.65 A wave of critical reactions immediately followed, focusing – under the input of 
Zypries’ statement – only on the opportunity of prosecuting the denial of the Holocaust, and not 
of other historical events. The British political scientist Timothy Garton Ash wrote in the Guard-
ian on January 1866 that this initiative, however well-intentioned, was “very unwise . . . [and] it 
would further curtail free expression – at a time when that is under threat from many quarters”. 
The German historian Eberhard Jäckel, in an interview on February 1 to Deutschlandradio,67 
also asserted that the denial of the Holocaust was “a stupid thing to do”, which, however, did not 
need to be punished unless it incited hatred, and which could be combated more effectively by 
information. In Italy, a wide-ranging discussion took place in January, when the Italian justice 
minister, Clemente Mastella, immediately followed his German counterpart in proposing a law 
criminalising the denial of the Holocaust in Italy.68 This initiative also resulted in an outcry from 
Italian historians:69 in one single day, more than 200 scholars signed a petition asserting that 
such a law was dangerous, useless and counterproductive, on the grounds: that it would provide 
deniers with “the opportunity to present themselves as defenders of freedom of expression”; 
that in its efforts to impose historical truth, the state would expose this truth to the risk of losing 
all legitimacy and would undermine “confidence in the free confrontation of stances and in free 
historiographical and intellectual research”; and that laws criminalising incitement to violence, 
incitement to racial hatred, and the praising of crimes against humanity already exist in Italy. 
The petition concluded with the assertion that civil society alone was empowered to struggle 
against Holocaust denial by means of “a cultural fight, by ethics and by steadfast policy”. In the 
face of such opposition and outrage, Mastella modified his bill by eliminating all references to 
Holocaust denial and by turning it into a modification of the so-called Mancino law (legge Man-
cino)70 of 1993, which prosecuted racial discrimination, by imposing tougher penalties only on 
those who “disseminate ideas of racial superiority”.71 In the event, this proposed law was never 
tabled for discussion in the Italian parliament. Also the French association Liberté pour l’Histoire 
protested against the Framework decision, pointing out, among other things, the “perverse ef-
fects” of the Gayssot law.72
The concern of historians spread also beyond the borders of the European Union. In particular, 
the general assembly of the International Committee of Historical Sciences (ICHS), held in Bei-
jing on 17–18 September 2007, approved a motion expressing great alarm at this possible in-
trusion of the law into the field of historical research, and inviting all affiliated organisations to 
thoroughly discuss the matter with their members; moreover, the ICHS decided to organise a 
special session on this issue at its next international congress, which took place in Amsterdam 
on 22–28 August 2010.73 A few days before the Beijing meeting, the American Historical Asso-
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ciation issued a communication concerning the Framework decision, stating that any scientific 
research may only be assessed by experts belonging to the same research field. Therefore, if a 
historian should distort his evidence, the only measures to be taken against him, by colleagues 
specialised in the same field, should be the exclusion from academic posts and, in extreme cas-
es, from publications. And it concluded: “If any other body, especially a body with the right to initi-
ate legal proceedings and impose penalties, seeks to influence the course of historical research, 
the result will inevitably be intimidation of scholars and distortion of their findings.”74
The criticism of historians did not influence the march of the Framework decision, which now 
speeded up towards its fulfilment. On 17 April 2007, the Council of the European Union issued a 
new draft.75 In this phase a new problem arose: the three Baltic countries, Poland and Slovenia 
demanded that the crimes perpetrated by the Soviet regime be included in the Framework de-
cision.76 This initiative was not extemporaneous: three years before, in 2006, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe had voted a resolution which called for the international con-
demnation of the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes, not only those of the past, but also 
those still in power.77
This demand encountered opposition, for instance from the United Kingdom,78 and eventually its 
proponents abandoned it in exchange for the following declaration, appended to the text of the 
draft, which promised that the issue would be reconsidered in the future: 
The Framework Decision is limited to crimes committed on the grounds of race, colour, 
religion, descent or national or ethnic origin. It does not cover crimes committed on other 
grounds, e.g. by totalitarian regimes. However, the Council deplores all of these crimes . . . 
The Berlin declaration adopted on 25 March 2007 stated that “European integration shows 
that we have learnt the painful lessons of a history marked by bloody conflict”. In that light 
the Commission will organise a public European hearing on crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes committed by totalitarian regimes as well as those who 
publicly condone, deny, grossly distort or trivialise them, and emphasises the need for ap-
propriate redress of injustice and – if appropriate – submit a proposal for a framework de-
cision on these crimes.
The public hearing on the crimes of totalitarian regimes, mentioned in this declaration, was or-
ganised a year later, on 8 April 2008, during Slovenia’s presidency of the European Union. Many 
speakers harshly condemned the double standard towards Nazi and communist crimes, which 
was widespread in western Europe for cultural and political reasons, and which was reflected 
by the draft of the Framework decision.79 The lenient attitude towards Russia and its president, 
Vladimir Putin, who extolled the role of the Soviet army as the liberator of Europe, was also 
blamed. Because of that, the states which were once behind the “Iron Curtain” now felt that their 
suffering under the Soviet Union and their domestic communist regimes was not acknowledged 
in the new Europe. Moreover, the current concept of genocide was criticised for excluding politi-
cal and social groups, a decision which was taken by the United Nations in 1948, when the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was approved, as a result of 
the pressure of the Soviet Union, and which has been adopted by the statute of the International 
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Criminal Court.80 At the end of the hearing, the Lithuanian delegation proposed a set of initiatives 
to investigate the crimes of communist and other totalitarian regimes in Europe and to promote 
awareness of them: among the proposals was the establishment of a day of commemoration 
for their victims on 23 August, the anniversary of the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact.81 
Thus, both Germany and the Soviet Union were given equal responsibility for the outbreak of the 
Second World War. This demand was fulfilled only a few months later, when, on 23 September 
2008, the European Parliament declared August 23 as the “European Day of Remembrance for 
Victims of Stalinism and Nazism”.82 
After passing through a debate in the European Parliament on 29 November 2007,83 the final text 
of the Framework Decision was approved by the Council of the European Union on 28 Novem-
ber 2008 and entered into force on 6 December 2008.84 Art. 1 § 1 opens, as usual, with a refer-
ence to racism and xenophobia:
1. Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the following inten-
tional conduct is punishable:
(a) publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member 
of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic 
origin; 
(b) the commission of an act referred to in point (a) by public dissemination or distribution of 
tracts, pictures or other material.
Then come two subparagraphs dealing with historical events and the related criminal conducts 
of “publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising”, which, unlike the first version of 2001, are 
evenly attributed to all genocides, crimes against humanity and war crimes:
(c) publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising crimes of genocide, crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes as defined in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by 
reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin when the conduct is 
carried out in a manner likely to incite to violence or hatred against such a group or a mem-
ber of such a group;
(d) publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising the crimes defined in Article 6 of the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal appended to the London Agreement of 8 Au-
gust 1945, directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by ref-
erence to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin when the conduct is car-
ried out in a manner likely to incite to violence or hatred against such a group or a member 
of such a group.
According to art. 3 § 1, all these criminal conducts are “punishable by criminal penalties of a 
maximum of at least between 1 and 3 years of imprisonment”.
In art. 1 § 1 (c) and (d) one can observe an important limitation on the prosecution, which was 
lacking in the first version of 2001: namely, that the aforementioned crimes cannot be prose-
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cuted unless they have a racist or xenophobic aim and are likely to incite to violence or hatred. 
That means, that only qualified criminal conducts can be prosecuted. By that, historical research 
seems to be safe enough, but interpreting what “likely to incite” means is a slippery slope. 
In the following paragraphs of art. 1, there is a set of clauses which define possible additional 
restrictions to the application field of the previous norms, which were included in order to avoid 
conflicts with the peculiarities of the different juridical systems and traditions of the member 
states, thus giving them an important flexibility in the adoption of the Framework decision. 
Two clauses concerning the criminal conducts are declared by art. 1 § 2:
For the purpose of paragraph 1, member states may choose to punish only conduct which 
is either carried out in a manner likely to disturb public order or which is threatening, abu-
sive or insulting.
The reference to public order meets, for instance, the requirements of Germany, which in fact 
annexed to the text of the Framework decision a reservation on this point.85 The following ref-
erence to the character of being “threatening, abusive or insulting” matches British legislation, 
which punishes “acts intended or likely to stir up racial hatred” perpetrated by “threatening, abu-
sive or insulting words or behaviour, or . . . any written material which is threatening, abusive 
or insulting”.86 
Paragraph 4 touches the crucial point of the definition of the courts which are entitled to rule on 
historical events: 
Any Member State may, on adoption of this Framework Decision or later, make a statement 
that it will make punishable the act of denying or grossly trivialising the crimes referred to 
in paragraph 1(c) and/or (d) only if the crimes referred to in these paragraphs have been es-
tablished by a final decision of a national court of this Member State and/or an international 
court, or by a final decision of an international court only.
This clause was absent both from the Joint Action and from the first draft of the Framework 
decision, and has very relevant consequences. In fact, if the power is given only to international 
courts, the range of historical events which can be involved is quite limited. The international 
courts have up to now been the Nuremberg tribunal, the International Criminal Court, which has 
nonretroactive competence but can only judge crimes committed after 1 July 2002,87 and the ad 
hoc international tribunals, such as those on the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Of course, this 
limitation does not solve the root problem, because historical research on these recent crimes, 
and on futures ones, remains under fire. But at least previous historical events, such as those 
which have been object of the French memory laws or of Ukrainian legislation, are excluded. On 
the contrary, the competence of national courts has potentially no time limits, especially as they 
mainly follow laws passed by national parliaments, as one can see in the case of the Ukrainian 
court condemning Stalin for genocide. This clause has given rise to a very differentiated land-
scape: an historical event can be considered a crime against humanity in one member state and 
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not in another, and opinions regarding it can be punished in one member state but not in another. 
One can easily imagine the consequences of this for the free movement of historians or even for 
the translation of history books.
This final version of the Framework decision also included art. 7 (Constitutional rules and funda-
mental principles), which gave more guarantees to the member states in terms of protection of 
freedom of expression. This article was absent in the first drafts and evidently reflects the ten-
sions that characterised the long process of the finalisation of this text:
1. This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect 
fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles, including freedom of expression and 
association, as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.
2. This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of requiring Member States to take 
measures in contradiction to fundamental principles relating to freedom of association and 
freedom of expression, in particular freedom of the press and the freedom of expression in 
other media as they result from constitutional traditions or rules governing the rights and 
responsibilities of, and the procedural guarantees for, the press or other media where these 
rules relate to the determination or limitation of liability.
The breadth of free space granted by this quite indeterminate article seemed excessive to the 
European Commission, which quite unusually inserted into the minutes of the Council a state-
ment which expresses its disagreement as an annex to the Framework decision:
However, the Commission considers that Article 7(2) might be interpreted as allowing na-
tional law to prevail over Union law. In this connection, the Commission draws attention to 
the primacy of Union law.88
In this annex one finds not only this statement from the European Commission but also oth-
ers expressed by some member states, which stress their own points of view and reservations 
on the implementation of the Framework decision. Among them there is the special concern 
with communism of some member states. Latvia asserted that the Framework decision should 
also encompass the crimes committed by communist regimes, and expressed a strong plea for 
putting both Nazi and communist crimes on the same level.89 Poland also joined the Latvian po-
sition on the inclusion of communist crimes,90 but in addition it stressed a particular point con-
cerning the German occupation during the Second World War. It proposed a new criminal con-
duct, that of “public gross distortion”, with special reference to the use of the expression “Polish 
concentration camps”, which was considered as “shifting the responsibility for crimes committed 
for racist and xenophobic reasons . . . from the actual perpetrators thereof”.91 In fact, for many 
years Polish diplomacy has been engaged in combating the use of the term “Polish concentra-
tion camps” to refer to Auschwitz, Treblinka and so on, which surfaces from time to time in the 
media.92 This expression is certainly wrong and misleading, because it conflates the geographi-
cal location of the Nazi concentration camps with their historical perpetrators. But with this 
statement, the Polish government goes far beyond a diplomatic intervention aiming to redress 
a mistake, and seeks to make use of judicial power to punish a mistake. 
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Finally, very interesting is the attitude of France, which has declared that it will limit the compe-
tence of the Framework decision only to crimes which have been condemned by an international 
court.93 This position goes against the previous politics of the French memory laws, which have, 
in fact, experienced a turnaround because of recent domestic debates. In 2008, a parliamentary 
commission on historical memory, after consulting many historians, philosophers and jurists, de-
clared that, even if the existing French memory laws could not be abolished, no more laws con-
cerning historical events should be introduced, especially if they foresee a criminal prosecution, 
and invited the French government to enter a statement to art. 1 § 4 of the Framework decision.94
The adoption of the Framework decision by EU member states
According to art. 10 § 1 of the Framework decision, the general deadline for adoption was 28 
November 2010, but up to the end of July 2011 many states had yet to do this. Those which have 
already adopted it give a motley picture, even more than expected looking at the clauses inserted 
in the text and to the appended statements. 
A very interesting case is Hungary because it provides clear evidence of the political biases that 
these laws have reflected. The Framework decision was first adopted in February 2010, in art. 
269/C of the Hungarian penal code, which punished with three years’ imprisonment “anyone 
who in public infringes the dignity of victims of the Holocaust, or denies the reality of, or doubts 
or trivialises the Holocaust”.95 The law placed heavy limitations on the application of the Frame-
work decision: it was purely a law against Holocaust denial, thus excluding the provisions of 
art. 1 § 1 (c). The prime minister then was Gordon Bajnai, of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). 
Soon afterwards, the political balance of forces changed, with the victory of the rightwing parties 
in the elections of 11 and 25 April 2010. The new government was led by Viktor Orbán, leader 
of the Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz), which formed a coalition with the Christian Democratic 
People’s Party (KDNP) and the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), and one of the first bills 
approved by the new government was the amendment of art. 269/C,96 which replaced the spe-
cific mention of the Holocaust with genocide and other crimes against humanity perpetrated by 
both Nazi and communist regimes. Neither version indicates which courts are entitled to judge 
historical events, and restricting clauses, such as those on the incitement to violence or hatred, 
or disturbing public order, foreseen by the Framework decision, are also absent. Such a norm 
can therefore lead to abuses.
Among the states once behind the “Iron Curtain”, Lithuania approved on 15 June 2010 art. 170–
2 of its penal code,97 which also explicitly mentions communist crimes: it punishes the public 
condoning, denial or gross trivialisation of genocide and other crimes against humanity or war 
crimes as defined in legal acts of the European Union or of the Republic of Lithuania (thus mean-
ing their parliaments, a new authority besides the courts) or by a final decision of a Lithuanian or 
international court. It then adds the aggression of the Soviet Union and Germany against Lithua-
nia during the Second World War, the aforementioned crimes perpetrated by the Soviet Union 
and by Germany, and finally other serious crimes against its citizens perpetrated in 1990–1991, 
during the independence struggle against the Soviet Union. These conducts can be punished only 
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if they are deemed threatening, abusive or insulting, or to disturb public order, and the penalty 
is a fine or restriction of liberty for up to two years. 
In 2009, Latvia amended its penal code,98 imposing the penalty of no less than five years’ impris-
onment or community work on “a person who commits public glorification of genocide, crime 
against humanity, crime against peace or war crime or public denial or acquittal of implement-
ed genocide, crime against humanity, crime against peace or war crime”.99 The definition of the 
criminal conducts is a bit different from the Framework decision, notably through the absence of 
“gross trivialisation” and its replacement by “glorification”. There is no indication of which courts 
are entitled to rule on historical events. Looking at the statement annexed to the Framework 
decision, one might be surprised that Latvia does not mention communist crimes: in any case, 
they must be considered as part of the general formulation.
There are also other states which do not explicitly mention Nazi or communist crimes, but which 
prefer a generic reference without indication of the perpetrators. 
Slovenia, even before the final approval of the Framework decision, published in May 2008 a new 
penal code, in which art. 297 on “Public incitement to hatred, violence or intolerance” punishes by 
imprisonment of up to two years whoever “denies, diminishes the significance of, approves, dis-
regards, ridicules, or advocates genocide, the Holocaust, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
aggression or other criminal offences against humanity”.100 The set of criminal conducts is thus 
enlarged, with the addition of “ridicule”, which endangers cartoonists, for example. 
Slovakia in 2009 adopted the Framework decision with section 424a of its penal code, which pun-
ishes with one to three years’ imprisonment the conduct of condoning, denying or “seriously de-
preciating” a crime of genocide, a crime against humanity or a war crime defined as such by an 
international court whose jurisdiction is recognised by the Slovak Republic.101 
On 13 April 2011 the Bulgarian National Assembly adopted the Framework decision by making 
some amendments to the country’s penal code.102 Among them, art. 419a punishes with impris-
onment from one to five years the denial, justification or gross trivialisation of crimes against 
peace and humanity, in cases where these conducts are dangerous or violent or stir up hatred 
and target individuals or groups of people defined by “race, colour, religion, descent or national 
or ethnic origin”. 
In March 2011, Germany adopted both the Framework decision and the Additional protocol to the 
Convention dealing with cybercrime.103 The only change to art. 130 § 1 of the Strafgesetzbuch was 
the addition of individuals as targets, whereas before only groups were mentioned. This article, 
as we have seen, only dealt with the Holocaust. Concerning the other crimes against humanity 
or war crimes, nothing has been changed in the penal code because – as one reads in the pre-
paratory report for this law – they are already covered by art. 140 of the Strafgesetzbuch, which 
punishes with a prison sentence of up to three years or a fine the public approval of a wide ar-
ray of crimes, from sexual offences to high treason to counterfeiting of money, including crimes 
against humanity and war crimes in general.104 
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Romania considers that its legislation fully covers the requirements of the Framework deci-
sion, and therefore deems no further legal changes as necessary.105 The same decision has 
been taken by Portugal.106 In fact, as shown above, both states already punish various forms of 
denial and related crimes. 
Malta adopted, on 17 July 2009, an amendment to its penal code107 which closely follows the 
Framework decision. The new article, 82 B, punishes by imprisonment for a term between eight 
months to two years 
Whosoever publicly condones, denies or grossly trivialises genocide, crimes against human-
ity and war crimes directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined 
by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin when the conduct 
is carried out in a manner
(a) likely to incite to violence or hatred against such a group or a member of such a group
(b) likely to disturb public order or which is threatening, abusive or insulting.
The following article, 82 C, includes in the same way crimes against peace, which it defines as
(a) the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation 
of international treaties, agreements or assurances
(b) participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts 
referred to in paragraph (a).
This definition copies the wording of article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal. 
But once more, there is no indication of the other courts which are entitled to define the criminal 
nature of historical events. 
Other member states continue in their previous policy of punishing only racist behaviour in gen-
eral but not specific forms of denial and other related criminal behaviours, thus ignoring the 
characteristic feature of the Framework decision. 
The United Kingdom considers that the Framework decision is already covered by the Public Or-
der Act of 1986 and therefore no change is needed.108 A close insight into the British point of view 
and preoccupation about the risks for freedom of expression can be gained from the debates 
of the House of Lords in 2007. The upper house expressed concern about the language used in 
art. 1 for the definition of the criminal conduct, in particular concerning the restrictions of “likely to 
disturb public order” or “threatening, abusive or insulting” and the vague meaning of “grossly triv-
ialising”.109 Also the prosecution of Holocaust denial was considered problematic, and in its reply, 
the government asserted that it did not intend to make it a criminal offence in the United King-
dom, as this would represent “an unnecessary infringement of freedom of expression”, unless 
it was expressed in a “threatening, abusive, or insulting way and incites racial hatred, or is likely 
to do so”, because in this case it would be already unlawful under the Public Order Act 1986.110
A similar stance has been taken by Ireland,111 on the basis of the Prohibition of Incitement to Ha-
tred Act of 1989, which punishes any oral or written expression or behaviour which are “threat-
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ening, abusive or insulting and are intended or, having regard to all the circumstances, are like-
ly to stir up hatred”, and by Sweden, in particular on the base of chap. 16 § 8 of its penal code, 
which prosecutes many forms of hate speech.112 In Denmark sect. 266 b of the penal code113 is 
considered to comply with the Framework decision.114 Also the Netherlands has not made any 
changes to its penal code, as announced in the statement annexed to the minutes of the Frame-
work decision, where it declared that 
Articles 137c, 137d and 137e of the Dutch Criminal Code give a broad criminalisation of incit-
ing to hate or violence, of insulting or discriminating because of amongst others race and re-
ligion. The term “race” includes also the characteristics skin colour, origin and national or eth-
nic decent. Under the scope of these Articles also fall condoning, denying or grossly trivialis-
ing of the international crimes, referred to in Article1 subparagraphs c and d, as far as such 
a conduct incites to hate or violence, insults or discriminates because of race or religion.115
In May 2011 Finland adopted the Framework decision by an amendment of the penal code which 
sharpened the punishment of racist and discriminatory conducts, but which did not mention the 
denial and similar conducts related to genocide and crimes against humanity.116 
In Greece, which at present only punishes hate speech and racial discrimination, a justice minis-
try committee has drafted a bill which covers the provisions of art. 1 § 1 (c) and (d) of the Frame-
work decision, with the condition that the definition of these events as crimes has been estab-
lished by a national or international court. The foreseen punishment equals a maximum impris-
onment of two years and a pecuniary penalty ranging from €1,000–3,000.117 As of July 2011, this 
bill has not yet been tabled in parliament. 
Finally, no initiatives or decisions for the adoption of the Framework decision have been taken 
up to July 2011 by the other member states.
Conclusions
The many objections made to the Framework decision during its long history have brought about 
a final text which gives great latitude to member states in the process of adoption, and, as one 
can see from the current state of this process, this latitude has been widely exploited. All in all, 
the original aim of the Framework decision, the harmonisation of the penal provisions of the 
member states, can be considered to have failed for the moment. But even in its current weak-
ened form, the Framework decision cannot be considered harmless and ineffective. In fact, it 
has caused the legislation on the punishment of denial and the other related criminal conducts 
to be adopted by member states which previously ignored it. In addition it has also fuelled the 
ongoing history wars in eastern Europe between Russia and its neighbours. Under President 
Vladimir Putin, the memory of the Great Patriotic War has been successfully reshaped as a main 
founding myth of the new state, together with a certain normalisation of Stalin.118 This vision ob-
viously clashes with the negative vision of the Soviet Union’s victory and of its consequences that 
is nurtured in the former Soviet but now independent republics and in others states which were 
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behind the “Iron Curtain”. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has already been dealt with. 
Another relevant incident in this clash was the removal of the monument to the Soviet soldier 
from the centre of Tallinn to a military cemetery on 27 April 2007, which aroused the indigna-
tion of Estonia’s Russian minority and of the Russian government and public opinion. The idea 
of dismantling Soviet monuments has also been debated in Latvia119 and in Poland,120 and an ad-
ditional reason for outrage in Russia was the annual march held in Riga to commemorate the 
Latvian Waffen-SS, who fought against the Red Army.121
There was a double response from the Russian side: a law and a commission. United Russia, 
the party supporting Putin and his successor, Dmitry Medvedev, introduced on 6 May 2009 a bill 
to the Duma, which punished with a fine of up to 300,000 roubles or imprisonment of up to three 
years the misrepresentations of the Nuremberg tribunal or of national trials or tribunals based 
on the Nuremberg tribunal aimed at the total or partial rehabilitation of Nazism and Nazi crimi-
nals, or the criminalisation of any actions undertaken by the member states of the anti-Hitler 
coalition, as well as the approval or denial of Nazi crimes against peace and humanity. The pen-
alties were sharpened (a fine up to 500,000 roubles and five years’ imprisonment) if the culprit 
was an on-duty official or if these ideas were spread through the mass media.122 A few days later, 
on 15 May 2009, Medvedev signed a decree for the establishment of a presidential commission 
“to counter attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia’s interests”, among whose 28 
members were mostly politicians and officials of Russia’s armed forces and of the intelligence 
service, with only three historians selected.123 
The combination of the two tools could prove very effective in prosecuting unwelcome histori-
cal opinions. Both the bill and the commission met strong criticism both in Russia (for instance, 
from the human rights organisation Memorial and by a group of historians and intellectuals in St 
Petersburg) and abroad (among others by Liberté pour l’Histoire and by the American Historical 
Association).124 But the bill, even though it was approved by the Duma’s legislative commission, 
was not supported in the event by the government because of legal inconsistencies in the text 
and because it could result in undesirable foreign policy consequences.125 This stance can be in-
terpreted as evidence for a changed attitude on Medvedev’s part towards the evaluation of the 
Soviet past and his policy of appeasement with Russia’s western neighbours, which can also be 
seen in his condemnation of Stalin for crimes against his citizens,126 in his visit to Katyń togeth-
er with Poland’s President Bronisław Komorowski127 and in the fact that in November 2010 the 
Duma recognised Stalin’s responsibility for this massacre.128 In this new political context, the bill 
was resubmitted by United Russia to the Duma on 16 April 2010 in a different form, which only 
punishes “public approval or denial of Nazi crimes against peace and security of humanity de-
termined by the Nuremberg tribunal verdict”, and with the same penalties.129 The punishment of 
accusations against the Soviet Union has thus disappeared. A positive outcome, for the moment, 
but, in any case, another piece of evidence for the political bias in history.
The Framework decision has thus legitimised and supported the trend of passing criminal leg-
islation on history, and its effects are not over, not only because of the foreseen possibility of 
the emergence of a new, similar text on crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes committed by all totalitarian regimes, with the communist ones being the clear target, 
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but also because art. 10 § 3 establishes that before 28 November 2013 the European Council 
shall review the text in the light of the implementation by member states. According to the Eu-
ropean Commission’s statement on art. 7 § 2, a conflict can be expected with the member states 
that have not fully complied with the provisions of the Framework decision. The game is still on 
and its outcome will depend on the attitude of member states which have up to now resisted. In 
this context, one must underline the evolution of France’s attitude, which after opening the Pan-
dora’s box of the Gayssot law, had the courage and determination of sealing it with the Accoyer 
report, listening to the opposition of historians and other members of civil society, and, thus, 
putting a first stop to the trend of the criminalisation of historical discourse.
Postscript
This article was in press when the trend of French politics was reversed once more. On 22 De-
cember 2011, the National Assembly approved, on its first reading, a bill which extends the pe-
nal provisions of the Gayssot law to those who have “disputed or minimised in an extremist way 
(“contesté ou minimisé de façon outrancière”) the existence of one or more crimes of genocide 
defined by art. 211-1 of the penal code and recognised as such by the French law”. This bill has 
been officially presented as the implementation of the EU Framework decision, but actually it 
contradicts the French statement annexed to it. This bill was introduced by MP Valérie Boyer of 
the Union for a Popular Movement, President Sarkozy’s party, and subsequently the Socialist 
Party declared its intention to reintroduce again to the Senate, where the Left has the majority 
since the September 2011 elections, the bill on the Armenian genocide approved by the National 
Assembly in 2006 but repealed by the Senate in May 2011. Political observers have stressed in-
ternal political reasons for this new bill, which has provoked a heated reaction from the Turkish 
government (Natalie Nougayrède, “Coup de froid entre la France et la Turquie”, Le Monde, 22 Dec 
2011; Patrick Roger, “Les députés pénalisent la négation des génocides”, Le Monde, 23 Dec 2011; 
Guillaume Perrier, “Génocide arménien: Ankara sanctionne Paris”, Le Monde, 24–26 Dec 2011). 
Immediate criticism has also come from the association Liberté pour l’Histoire (Françoise Chan-
dernagor, “Lois mémorielles: un monstre législatif”, Le Figaro, 29 Dec 2011; Pierre Nora, “Lois 
mémorielles: pour en finir avec ce sport législatif purement français”, Le Monde, 28 Dec 2011).
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